Born to adapt, but not in your dreams by Mulder, Theo et al.
  
 University of Groningen
Born to adapt, but not in your dreams





IMPORTANT NOTE: You are advised to consult the publisher's version (publisher's PDF) if you wish to cite from
it. Please check the document version below.
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Publication date:
2008
Link to publication in University of Groningen/UMCG research database
Citation for published version (APA):
Mulder, T., Hochstenbach, J., Dijkstra, P. U., & Geertzen, J. H. B. (2008). Born to adapt, but not in your
dreams. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(4), 1266-1271. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.concog.2007.04.001
Copyright
Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download or to forward/distribute the text or part of it without the consent of the
author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license (like Creative Commons).
Take-down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Downloaded from the University of Groningen/UMCG research database (Pure): http://www.rug.nl/research/portal. For technical reasons the
number of authors shown on this cover page is limited to 10 maximum.
Download date: 12-11-2019
Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
ConsciousnessConsciousness and Cognition 17 (2008) 1266–1271
and
CognitionBorn to adapt, but not in your dreams
Theo Mulder a,b,*, Jacqueline Hochstenbach b,c, Pieter U. Dijkstra d,
Jan H.B. Geertzen d
a Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, P.O. Box 19121, 1000 GC Amsterdam, The Netherlands
b Center for Human Movement Sciences, University Medical Center, University of Groningen, The Netherlands
c Ministry of Justice, Department of Forensic Aﬀairs, The Hague, The Netherlands
d Center for Rehabilitation, University Medical Center Groningen, The Netherlands
Received 22 January 2007
Available online 11 May 2007Abstract
The brain adapts to changes that take place in the body. Deprivation of input results in size reduction of cortical rep-
resentations, whereas an increase in input results in an increase of representational space. Amputation forms one of the
most dramatic disturbances of the integrity of the body. The brain adapts in many ways to this breakdown of the aﬀer-
ent–eﬀerent equilibrium. However, almost all studies focus on the sensorimotor consequences. It is not known whether
adaptation takes place also at other ‘‘levels’’ in the system. The present study addresses the question whether amputees
dream about their intact body, as before the amputation, or about the body after the amputation and whether the dream
content was a function of time since the amputation and type of amputation. The results show that the majority of the
dreamers reported dreams about their intact body although the mean time that elapsed since the amputation was twelve
years. There is no clear relation with the type of amputation. The results give modest evidence for the existence of a basic
neural representation of the body that is, at least, partly genetically determined and by this relatively insensitive for
changes in the sensory input.
 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Neural representations of the limbs are continuously updated by our movements. Repetition of movement
leads to the strengthening of these representations, whereas inactivity or non-use results in the shrinkage of
these representations. In a landmark experiment Merzenich et al. (1983) showed that if a body part becomes
less active, such as after deaﬀerentation, its topographical representation in the somatosensory cortex shrinks.
Dramatic changes in the cortical topographical organization occur after amputation. More than two decades1053-8100/$ - see front matter  2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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resentation of the adjacent digits. Amputations in humans produce similar eﬀects (Knecht et al., 1996, 1998).
Neural adaptations take place not only as a result of the deprivation of input, but also as a result of an
increase of input. Gaser and Schlaug (2003) showed that extensive musical training resulted in multi-regional
changes in the brain (gray matter volume). Even simple movements, repeated over a short period of time, are
eﬀective in inducing cortical representational changes (Classen, Liepert, Wise, Hallett, & Cohen, 1998; Van
Mier, Tempel, Perlmutter, Raichle, & Petersen, 1998).
Hence, the adult human brain is not a rigid system but a system that continuously undergoes plastic
changes after alterations in the sensory ﬂow from peripheral receptors and nerve ﬁbers. This ﬂow of multiple
sensory stimuli as a result of action (and perception) is for a large part responsible for the (conscious) aware-
ness of the body, which is termed the body scheme or body image.
Against this background, it can be asked whether less voluntary and less conscious processes adapt as rap-
idly and easily as the sensorimotor system. For example, does the content of dreams change as a result of
changes that take place in the body?
Although no consensus exists as how to deﬁne dreaming, one could argue that dreams are the result of the
subconscious brain processing our waking reality. A more formal deﬁnition is a non-conscious electrophysi-
ological state while the body is alive (Pagel et al., 2001). According to Ramachandran and Rogers-Ramachan-
dran (1996) a dream can be conceived of as a series of images, ideas, emotions, and sensations occurring
involuntarily in the mind during certain stages of sleep. Furthermore, they argue that in dream-states the brain
tries to interpret random impulses from the pons as sensory input, producing the vivid hallucinations we know
as dreams, whereby the interpretation of the sensory input is often based on past experience (Ramachandran
& Rogers-Ramachandran, 1996). Dreams may have an emotional or cognitive function in that they create a
‘‘virtual reality’’ constructed of internally generated images that, indeed, may represent memories, fears or
whishes (Ramachandran & Blakeslee, 1998). Recent neuro-scientiﬁc evidence indicated that sleeping and
dreaming, play a role in oﬀ-line memory reprocessing (Stickgold, Hobson, Fosse, & Fosse, 2001). Also Rev-
onsuo (2000) argued that the content of dreams is not random, but organized and selective. He indicated that
dream content is consistently and powerfully modulated by certain types of waking experiences.
The latter arguments form the starting point for the present study. When past and actual experiences play a
role in the content of dreams, it becomes an intriguing question whether changes in the conscious awareness of
the body in amputees will lead to changes in the contents of their dreams.
We asked whether subjects, who underwent a lower and/or upper limb amputation, dream about them-
selves as prior to the amputation (moving with intact limbs) or as after the amputation (moving with a
prosthesis).
As far as we know, this is the ﬁrst study ever that attempts to answer this question, maybe with the excep-
tion of an older phenomenological study that addressed, inﬂuenced by a psychoanalytic framework, the wish-
fulﬁlling nature of dreams in amputees (Shukla, Sahu, Tripathi, & Gupta, 1982).
2. Methods
2.1. Subjects
All participants were ex-patients of six major rehabilitation centers in The Netherlands and they were
approached through the physiatrists working in these centers. In total 250 ex-patients received a letter in which
they were asked to participate in this study. The study has been approved by the local medical ethics commit-
tee and after the participants gave their informed consent they received a simple questionnaire.
2.2. Procedure
All persons received a simple questionnaire containing only three questions: (1) do you dream yes/no, (2) if
yes, do you dream about yourself as prior to the amputation or as after the amputation, and (3) if you dream
about yourself as after the amputation, when did this shift in dream content took place: (a) immediately, (b)
between 1 and 6 months, (c) between 6 and 12 months, (e) after 12 months. Additionally participants were
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they were asked to ﬁll out the reason for amputation, type of amputation (upper or lower limb), single or bilat-
eral amputation, level of amputation (proximal or distal) and side of amputation (dominant or non dominant
side). The subjects did not receive any payment for their participation.
Statistical analysis was performed by using SPSS for Windows. For interval data independent sample t-tests
were performed. Diﬀerences in variation between the samples of comparison were checked with Levene’s test
for equality of variances and if necessary the appropriate adjustments were made in the degrees of freedom.
Dichotomous data were analyzed using v2 analysis.3. Results
In total 190 persons participated in the study (123 male, 67 female, mean age 55.3 yrs, SD 17.7; age range
25–80 yrs). The mean time that elapsed after the amputation was 12.0 yrs (SD 14.2). The amputation charac-
teristics are summarized in Table 1. Due to missing dream-data the results of 3 participants have been dis-
carded from the analysis. Of the remaining participants 146 (78%) reported that they were dreaming and
41 subjects denied having any dreams (22%). Of the ‘‘dreamers’’ 4% (n = 8) could not recall the topics of their
dreams and 30 subjects (21 %) of the ‘‘dreamers’’ dreamt on a regular basis about themselves as after the
amputation. However, 45 participants (31%) were dreaming solely about the situation prior to amputation
and 54 participants (37%) were dreaming in a mixed way (about the situation prior to as well as after the
amputation). No clear relation was found between dreaming and amputation characteristics or time elapsed
after the amputation (see Table 2).
There was, however, a signiﬁcant eﬀect of age. Participants who dreamt about their body as before the
amputation where signiﬁcantly older (59.3 yrs) than the participants who dreamt about their body as after
the amputation (51 yrs) (p = .0041). Furthermore, the participants who dreamt about their body as before








Other reasons 9 (18)
Amputation type
Upper limb 12 (22)
Lower limb 90 (172)
Upper and lower limb 2 (3)
Bilateral amputation
Bilateral amputationa 13 (25)
Bilateral upper limb 1 (2)
Bilateral lower limb 12 (24)
Amputation sideb
Amputation dominant side 55 (80)
Amputation non dominant side 45 (66)
Amputation level
Proximal amputationc 66 (124)
Distal amputation 34 (64)
a One patient claimed to have lost all extremities.
b Fourty-ﬁve missing data.
c Through elbow (knee) or more proximal.
Table 2
Dreaming about the body as
before the amputation (n = 45)
Dreaming about the body as
after the amputation (n = 30)
Years after amputation: Mean (SD) 10.1 (13.2) 13.1 (12.6) nsa
Current age: Mean (SD) 59.3 (17.0) 51.0 (16.4) 0.041a
Age at which the amputation was performed 49.2 (21.6) 37.9 (20.9) 0.029a
Vascular reason for amputation 0.002b
Yes (26) 22 (85) 4 (15)
No (49) 23 (47) 26 (53)
Traumatic reason for amputation nsb
Yes (28) 14 (50%) 14 (50%)
No (47) 31 (66%) 16 (34%)
Proximal amputation nsb
Yes (47) 30 (64%) 17 (36%)
No (27) 15 (56%) 12 (44%)
Amputation of dominant side nsb
Yes (33) 22 (67%) 11 (33%)
No (25) 13 (52%) 12 (48%)
Amputation nsb
Upper extremity (6) 2 (33%) 4 (67%)
Lower extremity (69) 43 (62%) 26 (38%)
Gender nsb
Female (25) 14 (56%) 11 (44%)
Male (50) 31 (62%) 19 (38%)
Amputees who dream variable (with or without the amputated extremity) are excluded from this analyses.
a Results of independent sample t-test.
b Results of v2 analysis.
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that participants with a vascular reason for amputation dreamt more frequently about their body as before the
amputation (85%) than participants with other reasons for amputation (47%) (p = .002). Indeed, amputations
on basis of vascular pathology are performed more often at an older age. None of the other amputation char-
acteristics, however, was related to the content of dreams.
The participants who reported that they were dreaming about themselves as after the amputation, indicated
that the shift of the dream content took place more or less immediately (46%), or within the 6 months period
after the amputation (31%). Nine percent indicated that the shift took place between 6 and 12 months and 14%
reported a shift 1 year or more after the amputation.4. Discussion
In spite of the fact that the primary and secondary motor cortices have been ‘‘re-mapped’’ after amputa-
tion, leading to the plausible expectation that this would lead to a permanent alteration of the body scheme,
other brain systems, especially those involved in dreaming, seem to re-create the absent limb over and over
again, even years after amputation. In only 30 participants the system adapted fully to the actual body status,
in the remaining 108 participants there was still a revival of the absent limb during dream activities, even when
the amputation took place more than 12 years ago.
So, it seems that although the sensory and motor maps in the brain proved to be highly dynamic and adap-
tive as a result of experience there remains a ‘‘deeper layer’’ that is not so sensitive to change, but generates a
rather stable representation of the body as it was. How can we explain this ‘‘representational stability’’? Could
it be that there exists an abstract, genetically hardwired blueprint of the body that remains relatively stable in
spite of the dramatic alteration that took place in the ‘‘real’’ body? This idea of a hardwired blueprint is not
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limbs. They argued that the basic experience of the body is not solely based on information pathways fed by
sensory input, but that the body image is determined also partly by genetic factors. Furthermore, Melzack
(2001) stressed that the body is felt as a unity, partly independent of sensory input. The anatomical substrate
of this body-self feeling was termed the neuromatrix. The neurons in this matrix are genetically programmed
to produce some sort of ‘‘wholeness’’ of the body.
The present (dream) data are in accordance with these ﬁndings, in that they indicate that there are limits to
the experience-dependent changes in brain networks. It seems that changes in the sensory input do not inﬂu-
ence the body image at all levels of the network.4.1. Age dependency
The representational stability seems to increase with age, as is reﬂected by the signiﬁcant age-eﬀect: The
older one is when amputated, the more unlikely it is that the body image changes. This age-eﬀect is intriguing
and deserves some further attention. Two explanations may be given for this age eﬀect. First, it may be that a
relationship exists between the duration of the original body image (blueprint) and the stability of this image
after damage to the ‘‘lay-out’’ of the body. The longer the intact body and by this the original image exists, the
more likely it is that it will not change. However, it may also indicate that the adaptive capacity of the brain
declines when one becomes older. In that case the system is not able to change the image. Research about the
latter argument is more or less lacking. However, the fact that many younger amputees show also a stability of
the (original) body image after amputation indicates that a relationship with the duration of the image can not
provide the ﬁnal answer.4.2. Observation of movements made by others
Furthermore, persons with an amputated limb see, more or less continuously, the limb-movements of oth-
ers which may inﬂuence their own limb-representation. This is not at all a trivial remark, since it is known that
the observation of movements activates more or less the same brain areas as actually performing these move-
ments. Action observation activates areas in the premotor cortex as well as in the posterior parietal cortex (see
Buccino et al., 2001; Rizzolatti, 2005). The fact that the posterior parietal lobe is activated during action obser-
vation is interesting for the present discussion, since it is argued that this brain area plays a role in the forma-
tion of movement images.4.3. Concluding remarks
Although caution remains necessary, the study seems to show that, although the brain can be characterized
as a biological system, permanently adapting to changes in the sensory input, it shows also a remarkable sta-
bility in other domains. We admit that the present study has its limitations. The data-collection method is
rather simple, more sophisticated methods could have been used. Despite these limitations the results, how-
ever, may shed some light on one of the most mysterious neural phenomena, the body image.Declaration of interests
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